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FOREWORD
This document has been prepared by Computer Technology
Associates, Inc., Englewood, Colorado as a data requirement in
the performance of the Integrated Command, Control, Communication
and Computation (IC4) System Design Study Contract NAS5-26689
for NASA Goddard Space Flight Center.
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1.0	 INTRODUCTION
1.1	 Purpose
This	 document	 provides
	
a chronological summary
	
of	 the	 tasks
performed on the Integrated Command,	 Control,	 Communication and
Computation (IC4)
	 System Design Study (Contract NAS5-26689).
1.2	 Scope
The	 IC4	 System Design Study was awarded to Computer 	 Technology
Associates, Inc. in September, 1981. 	 This study was conducted in
three tasks, as follows:
a.	 Task 1:
	 TDRSS Era Command and Control System Study
b.	 Task 2:
	
Automating Real-Time Operations Study
C.	 Task 3:
	 Image Processing Work Plan Study
i The	 results	 of the TDRSS Era Command and Control 	 System	 Study
were	 documented	 in	 References 1 and 2. 	 The	 results	 of	 the
Automating	 Real-Time	 Operations
	
Study	 were	 documented	 in
Reference 3.	 The Image Processing Work Plan Study was added	 to
the	 IC4
	
contract	 at the	 request of	 NASA	 Headquarters.	 The
results	 of	 this task were transmitted to NASA Headquarters 	 and
are not included in this document.	 This report provides a brief
synopsis of the activities and results of the three study	 tasks.
For	 specific details concerning the individual tasks,
	 refer	 to
a
the referenced documents.
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1.3	 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
DOC Data operations; Control
DOM Data System Modernization
ERBS Eavtlj Radiation Budget Satellite
FY Fiscal Year
C3STDN Ground Station and Tracking Data Network
H/W Hardware
IC4 Integrated Command, Control, Commonications and
Computation
MMI Man-Machine Interface
MSOCC Multi-satellite Operations Control Center
NASCOM NASA Communications
NEEDS NASA End-to-End Data System
^.. POCC Project Operations Control Center
R-T Real-Time
SME Solar Mesospheric Explorer
SMM Solar Maximum Mission
STOL System Test and operations Language
S/W Software
TDRSS Tracking Data Relay Satellite System
TELOPS Teler-etry On-Line Processing System
TIPIT TDRSS Interface Preprocessor Into TELOPS
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;.0 APPLICALLE DOCUMENTS
1. CSFC C.Qr-unand alld Control Pgogtiona1 Ana_.., 1 v- ais Report,
Computer Technology Assoc,iates t Inc., October 31, 1981.
2. NE EDS Phase ,. Tech on lggy E ior^t, Report, Computer Technology
Associates, Inc., Octobet. 31, 1981.
3. Recommgndati ns ,f_M Automating Real-Time operations,
Computer Technology Associates, Inc., November 8, 1982.
4. IC4 System Design Study Progress Reports.
5. ILA System Functional Architectum, Computer Technology
Associates, Inc., August: 17, 1981.
6. Mitchell, Chris, "Human-"_:..:hine Interface Issues in the
Multi-Satellite Operations 	 Control Center-1", NASA
Technical Memorandum 83826, August 1981.
7. Automated MSOCC-1 DOC System Study Task Summary Report (B83-
D-17400-04) , June, 1981.
8. Minutes for Operations Planning Preliminary Design Review,
r/SM Project.
9. Computer Program Product Specification for DSM/Coimnanding
Computer Prograr,
10. Computer Program Product Specification for DSM/Mission
Control Complex Management Computer Program.
11. DSM Operations Concept.
12. Computer Program Product Specification for DSM/Display
Management Computer Program.
13. Computer Program Product Specification for DSM/Common
Services Computer Program.
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3.0 TASK 1 RESULTS: TDRSS ERA COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM STUDY
The purposes of this task were as fillows:
a4.	 Define the GSFC TDRSS era command and control system
functions.
b.	 Determine potential areas for introduction of automated
technology, alternative procedures and alternative
design which will improve performance and reduce cost
of the command and control process.
C,	 Recommend specific technology efforts to be pursued
during NEEDS Phase 3.
Zhis task was conducted in two subtasks. in Subtask 1, a
functional breakdown of the command and control system was
provided, and cost and performance factors were applied to this
functional structure. In Subtask 2, the NEEDS Phase 3 technology
effort in the command and control area was defined.
	 The results
of these two subtasks are summarized below.
3.1 COMMAND AVID CONTROL SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL STUDY
The GSFC Command and Control System Functional Study was
performed to define the TDRSS era command and control system
functional breakdown and to apply cost, and performance factors to
this functional structure. The purpose of this activity was to
determine the major command and control cost drivers and to
specify functions requiring further analyses and development
within the NEEDS Phase 3 arena. As summarized in Reference 11
command and control costs (FY 1983 projections) were examined for
the following GSFC institutional and project ;elated Gras:
a. Project Mission Operations.
b. Mission and Data Operations.
C.	 Networks.
The following information was provided as part of the analysis
for each of these areas:
a. Total cost of each function for FY 1983.
b. The percentage of cost allocated to command and
control for that function.
C,	 The actual command and control cost.
d.	 Development or o!ae time only costs versus recurring
costs.
r
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Project Mission Operations costs were analyzed for three GSFC
missions (DE,SMM,ERBS) to determine the number of personnel
supporting command and control functions. Mission and Data
Operations costs were provided for the following areas:
a. Mission Operations.
b. Programming, Computation and Analysis Operations.
Command and control costs v%tre also provided for the following
Network areas:
a. GSTDN Operations.
b. TDRSS Operations.
C.	 baser Tracking Subnet.
d. Operational Support Computing.
e. NASCOM Operations.
Cost data for each of these areas and cost data summaries are
summarized in Reference 1. The results of this analysis indicated
that relative to command and control costs, GSTDN operations and
Mission operations are the major cost drivers. 	 However, L. was
felt that relative to NEEDS GSTDN operations were adequately
being addressed by Code 800. Consequently, the emphasis within
the NEEDS command and control area was centered primarily around
Mission Operations as summarized in Section 3.2 below.
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3.2 RECOMMENDED NEEDS PRASE 3 TECHNOLOGY EFFORTS
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The purpose of this subtask was to analyze cost, performance and
mission drivers ^to determine the recommended emphasis of the
NEEDS Phase 3 technology efforts in the command and control area.
Reference 2 summarized the resulta of this subtask and completed
the TDRSS Era Command and Contral System Study,
In Reference 2, the following command and control tasks were
recommended:
a. operations Concept: for Automating Real-Time Operations.
b. Operations Concept for Command Generation.
C,	 Operations Concept for Scheduling 'TDRSS Support.
d. User-Computer Interaction Demonstration System.
e. Ground-Space Control Trade-Off Study.
f. Project Management Guidelines for Prelaunch Test and
Integration.
For each of these tasks, the purpose, number of phases (or
subtasks); phase description, output, and level=of=ef`ort were
defined.	 The detailed task; descriptions are contained in
Reference 2.
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4.0 TASK 2 RESULTS: AUTOMATING REAL-TIME OPERATIONS STUDY
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As a rea,ult of the TASK 1 effort, the IG4 contraot was redirected
to analyze real-time command and control operations to
identify and recommend functions suitable for automating.
The effort to conduct this task centered around two areas of
activity. One, to evaluate the real-time operations, information
was obtained that was useful for the GSFC human Factors Working
Group, particularly on the ERBS project, and this data was
presented to the Human Factor Working Group and at the Human
Factors Workshop held at GSFC in May, 1982. The second area
included the actual analysis of real-time operations to recommend
functions suitable for automation, as defined in the Statement of
Work.	 These two areas are summarized separately in Sections 4.1
and 4.2 below.
4.1 HUMAN FACTORS WORKING GROUP SUPPORT
To analyze ERBS real-time operations, technical interchange
meetings were conducted with ERBS personnel. The purpose of
these discussions was to review the ERBS cc-mmand panel and the
ERBS contact events. As a result, an ERBS contact scenario was
developed and presented f,.o the Human Factors Working Group.
Appendix A of this document contains this scenario which defines
real-time events, displays, and manual (operator 1 and 2) and
automatic actions.
	 in addition to the contact scenario, a
critique of the RRBO command panel was generated.
	 This critique
is contained in Appendix B.
In support of the Human Factors Workshop held May 26, 1982, a
presentation entitled "A Case Study of a System Engineered for
Control by Humans" was delivered. Appendix C contains the report
summarizing this presentation. In brief, the recommendation is
made that future operations be system engineered to implement a
real-tine health and safety operational philosophy called the
"watchman concept". The essence of this concept is to provide
information that identifies problems, not data, and to provide
on-board safing to protect hardware and contain the problem to
the failed component. An operator friendly approach to
contingency design is recommended where information is presented
in a format that the less experienced operator can readily recog-
nize and react to system problems. An approach to displaying
information is presented in the form of a star icon. This type
of display presents information which provides "the watchman"
type operator with a clear indication of a problem and provides a
second level of information detail as to the nature of the
problem.
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4.2	 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AUTOMATING REAL-TIME COMMAND AND CONTROL
FUNCTIONS
The	 purpose	 of this effort was to 	 analyze	 real-time mission
operations, identify	 functions currently being performed, 	 and
define	 real--time	 functions	 suitable	 for	 automating. Three
missions (SMM,
	
,ERGS,	 and SME) were selected as example missions
to	 use	 in	 conducting	 the	 analysis.	 The	 following eight
operational	 areas	 were defined and examined in detail for	 the
three missions:
a. Routine spacecraft statues and monitoring.
b. Presenting alarms to the operator.
a
c. Response to alarms.
d. Real-time science data monitor and response.
e. On-board spacecraft accommodation.
f, Pre-pass preparation.
g. Pass operations.
h. Post-pass operations.
For each of the major areas, a one-to-one ,.'omparison of functions
was generated	 to define the current or planned mode of operation
for	 each mission.	 Based on this comparison,
	
considerations for
automation were identified for each operational
	
area.	 Potential
techniques	 for implementing the automation were then identified,
I .	 and	 cost;	 performa nce and per sonnel ; issues 	 addressed	 c1	  and 	 AAUEA rfeL e 	 YtA L r.PAC	 Lor
each	 function.	 Based	 on	 this	 analysis, recommendations 	 for
t	 automating real-time f unctions were generated.
Key automation considerations	 identified as a result of the SMM•-
ERGS-SME analysis include:
a. Provide real-time trend plotting and analysis programs to
support routine spacecraft status and monitoring. 	 With this
feature the operator would have the capability in
	 real-time
to	 request
	
plots of any telemetry point or to execute 	 on-
.line analysis programs.
b.	 Provide	 automatic	 response	 to selected
	 anomalies	 by
;.	 transmitting	 precanned	 commands	 upon	 detection	 of	 the
anomaly
	 by the ground system.
	
Allow the acceptable set 	 of
automatic responses to increase as the mission matures.
^u
c. Provide the capability to pre-define branch points in the
uplink
	
process and to automatically select and execute
	 the
appropriate	 branch	 based on the downlink
	
telemetry	 data.
This	 capability	 supports real-time science	 data	 monitor
and response and spacecraft pass operations.
}	 ri
a
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d.	 Provide	 the capability to add automated 	 functions	 on-
board
	
as	 a mission	 progresses.	 candidates	 for	 on-board
automation
	
would	 include automatic responses	 to	 selected
k
anomalies where the automatic response has been occurring on
the	 ground	 but	 with	 confidence	 in	 its	 execution	 the
;automatic	 response	 to the anomaly is placed	 on-board	 the
spacecraft.
e.	 Provide the capability to automatically execute the pass
plan with operator intervention in event of anomalies or 	 as
required for selected pass activities.
The capability currently exists or is used (anticipated) for many
of	 the automation considerations 	 identified.	 However,	 certain
characteristics	 are	 inherent in the current system that 	 affectu the	 amount	 of automation that will be	 incorporated	 in	 future
4
operations.	 For	 example,
a.	 The operator is always in the loop to make decisions and
take	 action.	 In many cases operator action is essential to
spacecraft
	
command	 and	 control	 operations.	 However,	 in
selected	 instances,	 the	 ground	 system	 could	 make	 the
decision based on telemetry data and automatically take 	 the
appropriate action.
b.	 With	 the	 operator	 always in the loop, 	 there	 is	 the
potential for operator errors. 	 For routine operations where
ti,.;	 ground	 system can make the proper decisions 	 and	 take
{;:option, the chance for errors could be minimized.
C.	 The	 potential	 of	 over-loading	 the	 real-time	 system
may	 limit automated capability or imply need for 	 increased
computing capability.
d.	 Many	 projects incorporate selected automation but these
innovative	 ideas	 and	 implementation	 techniques	 are	 not
necessarily shared between missions.
e.	 operational	 costs often exceed development 	 costs.	 For
Long	 term	 missions,	 system	 life cycle	 cosh	 could	 be ;.
reduced	 by increasing the amount of operational; 	 automation
(ie,software) and ultimately development costs, but over the
life cycle of the mission the costs would be reduced. u	 }
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As a result of the IC4 analysis, the following recommendations
are made relative to automation in the future:
a. Develop and test an automated ?ass plan that controls
execution of all pass function go. Incorporate expert
system/decision aid technology to implement this system to
provide the automation considerations, to provide capability
to increase automation as a mission progresses, to allow
user interaction where necessary nd toy	 provide consistent
capabilities between missions.	 Evaluate nigh order
languages as a means of providing the user/operator
w	
interface with the automated pass plan.
b. Provide real-time science/subsystem user interaction to
select pre-canned commands or pre-defined branch points in
the uplink operations. Evaluate remote user operations for
interacting with the real-time system.
Ac. Evaluate and develop expert systems to support anomaly
investigations and to	 ultimately	 support real-time
spacecraft evaluatio:yi ,.
Based on these automation recommendations, the following options
are suggeste4 as the logical continuation of the IC4 effort:
it
a.	 perform a detailed requirements analysis for 	 automated
operations.	 This	 analysis would include generation of 	 an
Operations Concept and RequireTnents Document summarizing the
operations philosophy for implementing automated operations.
.. It	 is recommended that two techniques for implementation be
analyzed	 in	 depth as part of this 	 effort:	 a	 STOL	 based
} implementation	 and	 an	 expert	 system/decision	 aid
implementation	 using	 a	 high order language for	 the	 user
k	 "^ interface.
b.	 Evaluate	 the	 technique	 for	 implementing	 automated
} operations whereby a "front-end" processor provides the user
interface	 and analysis without impact to the current 	 real-
time	 system.	 This	 processor could provide the 	 automation
using	 either of the implementation techniques described 	 in
item (a)	 above.
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5.0 TASK 3 RESULTS: IMAGE PROCESSING WORK PLAN STUDY
In July, 1982, a third task was added to the IC4 contract at the
regtiest of NASA Headquarters. The purpose of Task 3 was to
develop a work plan and schedule for defining critical image
processing needs at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, for wissessing
alternatives means of meeting these needs, and For supporting
design and development of a recommended image processing system.
The results of this task were tAransmitted to NASA Headquarters.
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Foreword
t
This critique of the EBBS Command Panel Functional Design has
g	 been prepared by Computer Technology Associates, Inc., Denver,
F Colorado, under the IC System Design Study Contract, NASS-26689
t	 for NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) .
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l1.0 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This critique is for use as an evaluation tool in thse human
factors analysis being conducted by the Human Factors Group of GSFC.
1.2 Scope
This critique is a brief assessment of the advantages and disadvantages
of the current ERBS Command Panel Functional Design as documented
in "Command Panel Functional Specification," BFEC, March 1982. In
addition, clarification of technical details was accomplished in informal
interchange meetings with Mr. Steve Miles of BFEC on March S, 10 and
,
30, 1982.
2.0 Critique
i1
2.1
	 Advantages
The salient advantages of the command panel concept are the
retively simple man-machine interface provided and the consolidation
of many indications into a single work station /terminal.
2.1.1
	 Man-Machine interface
The command panel concept allows the use of graphics techniques,
colors, and positive operator selection auti-^ority to optimize human
factors considerations for the man-machino interface,
	
Graphics techniques
are employed in the command panel for the matrix layouts and alpha-
i. numerics, yielding a flexible format capability with variable line weights,
1
I
type styles and sizes, and scrolling for the pass plan matrix. 	 Colors
are used to represent selections, alarms and status throughout.	 The
!'fight emitting diode ( LED) matrix overlay requires the physical interrup-
tion of the beams in the matrix to cause a selection to be made.
u
2.1.2	 Singlea Work Station /Terminal
Many indications normally dispersed throughout several display
i pages in a traditional MSOCC environment are incorporated into the
command panel. 	 Alarm indications are provided for spacecraft and
,
NCC /TDRSS anomalies and a command reject indication responds to
application processor detected rejects.
	
Several lines at the top of
the display are reserved for a STOL syntax printout of the procedure
in progress, and two lines at the bottom are reserved for interactive
NCC messages.
r^
27
h
i
,
tad
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2, 2 Disadvantages
As currently defined, the command panel lacks tactile feedback, has
an extremely high density layout, offers no improvement over MSOCC
standard capabilities for unplanned contingencies and/or backout operations,
and due to its singularity in the EBBS application, raises reliability /main-
tainibility /availability concerns.
2.2.1 Tactile Feedback
The LED Matrix arrangement offers no tactile feedback to the
operator. The color change of the ' O button" selected provides the
only indication of the activation. This could be supplemented by the
fi	 voice synthesizer of other audible .cue, but these are not considered
optimum for routine operations. Also, dependent on the resolution
of the I ED fields, inadvertent selections could result from an unsteady
operator action or parallax error.
2.2.2 Lout
,'	 f The organization of the command panel is cluttered, particularly
when considering the multiple colors in the high density layout. This
I	 could lead to confusion or fatigue in operational scenarios, especially
when stress is a factor.
i	 2.2.3 Contingency /Backout Procedures
Under nominal operational conditions the advantages of the command
n	
panel (Section 2.1 above) can be exploited. In the event of an unplanned
kj	 contingency (one not supported by a procedure in the contingency
procedures matrix) ' or a backout operation (one calling for KILLPROC,
and subsequent directives) the operator reverts to normal MSOCC /STOL
practices. In these circumstances the command panel has not enhanced
the level of automation available to the operator, and in fact, requires
him to either reconfigure the command panel (invoke "STOL") or switch
'	 to a different (MSOCC) terminal.i
[.	 2.2.4 Reliability /Maintainability /Availability (R/M/A)
A failure in the command panel system, be it the mircrprocessor,
v
terminal, or LED matrix causes an abrupt reversion to normal MSOCC
practices. The R /M /A statistics for these equipments must be analyzed
to determine the level of training required to counter the risks
associated with a rapid turnaround to MSOCC practices, and to
establish a maintenance and sparing philosophy commensurate with
 the determined criticality of the equipments.
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3. D Conclusions
Since the command panel is a new development effort in itself,
other options should be explored prior to full-scale implementation of -
the command panel concept. The areas deserving of further study are:
a. ,Alternative Graphics: Use of menus, or other illustrative
representations for information currently contained in the
five matrices and alarm /reject indicators.
b. Operator Input /Output: Use of track ball, light pen, " mouse,"
membrane panel or other selection media. The track ball and
"mouse" are cursor positioning methods, the light pen and
membrane panel are direct selection methods.
c. Enhanced automation: Since the command panel is microprocessor
based, an investigation of additional tasks that could be per-
formed automatically (ex: "stepping" to the next procedure in
the nominal pass plan upon successful execution of the
preceding procedure) . Also, this should include studying
shifting of tasks between the EBBS microprocessor, applications
processor, and command panel microprocessor for load leveling,
process streamlining (ex: reduced 1/0) or other advantages.
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Historically,	 r:ASA/GSFC unmanned spacecraft command and
	
control
and	 health
	
and	 safety operations have	 been	 data	 and	 people
intensive.	 The	 increase	 in	 spacecraft	 complexity	 and	 the
resulting
	
increase in data required to establish the
	 spacecraft
status	 have	 made	 the traditional people intensive command 	 and
control operation both costly and a higher risk.
	 The	 increased
use
	
and	 capability of on-board computers provides us
	 with	 the
opportunity	 to examine alternatives to the traditional
	
concepts
i
for real-time health and safety operations.
n The	 pitfalls of the conventional contingency planning for health
F and	 safety	 are	 highlighted in Figure
	 1.	 The	 Solar	 Maximum
Mission	 ( SMM)	 contingency planning and operations	 provide	 one
r.
step	 in	 the evolution from this conventional 	 people	 intensive
health	 and	 safety operation	 toward a "night watchman" mode
	 of
operations.	 The SMM spacecraft health and safety operations were
budget	 constrained	 to the point that one week after launch 	 one
f% operator was responsible for the health
	
and safety of the entire
spacecraft.	 The spacecraft was a protoflight with
	 new subsystem
configurations,	 software	 and procedures.	 To manage	 the	 risks
associated
	 with	 this one man SMM health and
	 safety	 operation,
real-time	 contingency	 planning and operations
	 centered	 around
unambiguously	 identifying a system level problem and
	 reactively
safing	 components	 susceptible	 to	 unrecoverable	 damage.	 The
methodal ogy	 applied	 to	 both analyzing	 and	 implementing	 this
approach for SMM is shown in steps I-V below:
4 STEP 1.	 Identify	 spacecraft	 and	 experiment	 hardware	 damage
r
n	 g^,
susceptibility to unpredicted system level states.
I i.e. -Mispointing
-Unpredicted vehicle rates
t -Computer failure
* -Short on the power system.
r. As a general rule all lower level failures or 	 operator
errors will manifest themselves into one or more system
^'
^'
level anomalies.
^^
. ^
}	 ^} ^
} ^
!
^	 !\
\ [\
im
,
FIGURE I- TYPICAL CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS PROBL EMS	 \
LARGE CONTINGENCY PLAN IS UNMANAGEABLE
-TRAINING VERSOS RETENTION	 (	 '
-POTS UNFAIR RESPONSIBILITY ON THE HUMAN OPERATOR	 \
-ESQUIRES LARGE COMBINATION OF DATA AND DISPLAYS
-GENERALLY DOSS NOT COVER OPERATOR ERRORS
MOST FAILURES ARE NOT COVERED IN THE CONTIGENCY PLAN
TIME AVAILABLE TO RECOGNIZE PROBLEM RANGES FROM ,LIMITED
TO NONE
\\	 ^\6
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STEP II.	 Identify	 the	 minimum	 information	 and
	
limit	 values
required	 to	 unambiguously
	 identify	 system	 level
problems.
i.e. -P/Y and R position
Hardware/software
>	 u
-S/C rates
u
Hardware/software
j .
-S/C currents.
These may be directly in
	
the data
	 stream or	 computed
prior to display. ?`
STEP Ill. Identify	 and	 allocate the functions and time response
necessary to contain hardware damage (safe system). li
i.e. -on-board command response
-Control	 center command response time 	 rime	 andP	 (P
backup) .
1 Allocation is based on operational on-board capability;
time	 allowed	 from	 identification	 until	 damage
.irreversible.
Level of safing is dependent on recovery complexity.
^i i.e. -Turn off all instruments
-Leave	 computer	 running	 but	 disable
	
command
a function.
STEP IV.	 Establish	 operations policy,	 procexJures and 	 displays
# for
	 health	 and	 safety
	
monitoring	 and	 contingency
actions.
i.e. -Monitor these 20 parameters
w` -Get vehicle and instruments safe
.a
i -Issue procedure XYZ anytime mispointed.
Y,
The operator should not berequired to assume risk.
	 He
should	 be	 provided	 with	 the tools	 to	 recognize	 a z	 {
problem
	
and conservatively respond. 	 Where	 one	 time r:
science
	 is	 involved	 "what if	 planning"	 and	 backup
personnel should be provided.,
I	 i
^F
Y
-^
3 .	 i
lid , 1
{	 t^
i
l
i
STEP V. All other subsystem and benign system-level anomalies
should be categorized and operator responsibilities
defined.
i.e. -Unexpected configurations
-Thermal limits
The results of this analysis led to providing the SMM health and
safety operations monitor three levels of anomaly criticality, a
clear policy, and approximately twenty-nine parameters on two
displays within which he maintained spacecraft safety. The
levels of SMM anomaly criticaly and the SMM contingency
operations policies are provided below.
Category I Contingency Actions
o	 Safe hardware
o	 Analyze problem
o	 Stabilize vehicle
o	 Notify in-depth analysis
Category II Contingency Action°
o	 Notify in-depth analysis
o	 Analyze problem
o	 Prepare to safe hardware
Category III Contingency Actions
o	 Notify in-depth analysis
The two displays provided to monitor the twenty-nine parameters
are shown in Figures 2 and 3. The Flag column would provide the
operator with an indication of a category 1,2, or 3 severity. But
more importantly, the operator has instant cognition of a problem
by simply noting an entry in the flag column. Simple unambiguous
safing procedures which could be issued safely under any
conditions were A clear cut simple contingency plan shown in
Figure 4 was the prime reference for operator safing response.
The second result from the contingency analysis was the
indentification of those safing actions that were so time
critical they must be initiated by the on-board computer. These
were incorporated into the software applications processors.
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The successful results of the SMM contingency planning and
operations implementation provide the basis for further
simplification of spacecraft health and safety--the "watchman
concept." The basic signal to the SMM monitor that a problem
existed was his observation of a flag in the last column of the
two displays shown in Figures 2 and 3. One could easily envision
extending this concept to elimination of everything on the
display except the flag column.
The experience gained on SMM coupled with increasing operations
cost and increased use of flight computers, TDRSS, and ground
system graphics provide the opportunity to re-evaluate health and
saf et;; operations. The historical evolution of the personnel
assigned to monitoring spacecraft health and safety presents
another consideration. Traditionally the "experts" at launch are
off to their next project and are replaced by pure monitors by
six months after launch. The personnel exposed to contingency
training and familiar with the documentation are generally no
longer around.
Cost, technology and personnel considerations lead to a
suggestion that future operations be engineered to implement a
different real-time health and safety operational philosophy, the
"watchman concept." The essence of this concept is to provide
information that identifies problems, not data, and on-board
saf ing to protect hardware and contain the problem to the failed
component.
Systems engineering for the human function in health and safety
should consider the operator likely to be in place for the
routine operation. We need to provide both an operator friendly
approach to contingency design as well as the information in a
form that the less experienced operator can readily recognize and
react to system problems. The star icon in Figure 5 illustrates
one approach to displaying information which could provide both
"the watchman" type operator with a clear indication of a problem
and the experienced operator with the same indication.
	 It also
however provides a second level of information detail as to the
nature of the problem.
	 Either ground or on-board automated
responses could take the initial safing step.
	 Any change in
symmetry, color or stability of the star would readily be
detected.	 The sample points shown in fact represent those
category 1 flags shown in the SMM displays of Figures 1 and 2.
e
Once the concept of information display is
recognizable forms of display are developed,
and safety monitoring for many spacecraft
"watchman" could be a realizable operations
with today's operations the watchman would
soon as he detects an anomaly.
accepted and readily
the real-time health
simultaneously by a
goal for NASA. As
call "the expert" as
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The idea can be extended throughout operations. The center
director could have a bank of screens or even a composite icon
which at a glance gives him operational spacecraft status.
Remote experimenters could be given status information in the
same fashion. Sometime in the future f night and weekend health
and safety operations monitoring may even be able to be added to
the security guards checklist.
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